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ABSTRACT 
Even though in Spanish law the act establishing the adoption is 
judicial in nature, declarations of will have special relevance in the 
process, since they are a necessary precondition for the adoption. 
This work focuses on the assent of the biological mother, who is af-
fected by and has an interest in the adoption process, even if not a 
party to it herself. In this work, the foundation, configuration, and 
characteristics of this assent are studied, as well as the form of her 
declaration of will, and the ability of the mother to offer it. Special 
attention is paid to the minimum time limit for issuing this declara-
tion. This time limit is based on the European Convention on Adop-
tion and constitutes a legal limitation on women’s autonomy. As an 
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alternative to this limitation, we come with a proposal de lege 
ferenda which ensures a balance between the need for certain pre-
cautions and the free exercise of women’s decision-making power. 
This proposal is applicable to all European systems and is con-
sistent with the European Convention, which introduces this limita-
tion on women’s autonomy. Finally, a revision of the European Con-
vention is proposed to adapt it to the growing demand for increased 
autonomy for all persons. 
 
Keywords: Spain, adoption, autonomy of will, European Conven-
tion on Adoption, filiation, legal capacity, personal acts, protection 
of minors, Spanish law 
I. INTRODUCTION: ADOPTION AND ITS CONSTITUTIVE ACT 
Spanish Law 21/1987, of November 11, amended specific arti-
cles of the Civil Code (CC) and the Civil Procedure Law in the area 
of adoption with the aim of configuring adoption as an instrument 
of family integration for minors without a family life and to fight 
against child trafficking.1 In doing so, the configuration of adoption 
as a legal transaction between parents and adopters was left behind, 
replaced by a system that constituted adoption through a judicial res-
olution with prior administrative control. This system, with some 
changes, has remained in place until today. The most notable modi-
fications in this regard come from Organic Law 1/1996, of January 
15, on the Legal Protection of Minors (OLLPM) and Organic Law 
26/2015, of July 28, 2015, on the modification of the System for the 
Protection of Children and Adolescents.2 
In contrast to the system of conventional constitutive act, this is 
a system of constitution through a public authority,3 specifically, a 
 
 1. The legislator understood—as stated in the Preamble to the act—that 
there was an almost complete lack of control over the actions preceding adoption, 
something which was “necessary if it is to fulfil its true social purpose of protect-
ing minors deprived of a family life.” 
 2. Other laws that have amended the Civil Code in this area are: Law 
13/2005, Law 54/2007, and Law 15/2015. 
 3. See the distinction between these two systems made by MIGUEL ÁNGEL 
PÉREZ ÁLVAREZ, LA NUEVA ADOPCIÓN 201 et seq. (Civitas 1989).  




judicial authority. Adoption is constituted by judicial resolution as 
stated in article 176.1 CC. However, this system relies on strong ad-
ministrative intervention, given that, save for exceptional cases, the 
public entity has the exclusive authority to initiate the judicial pro-
ceeding by presenting the adoption proposal before the judge. In ad-
dition, before the judicial proceeding, the public entity is responsible 
for issuing the declaration of the adopters’ suitability and their se-
lection.4 Likewise, it has the capacity to create a guardianship for 
adoption5 before the submission of the proposal.6 On the other hand, 
the system does not dispense with the declarations of will of those 
who are impacted by the adoption and any other subjects involved.7 
As a rule, the iter implemented is as follows: the public entity 
declares the suitability of the adopters, proceeds to their selection 
and, when appropriate, creates a guardianship for the purpose of 
adoption. Subsequently, it presents the adoption proposal to the 
judge thus initiating the judicial adoption procedure. The judge will 
gather the pertinent declaration of will and, if necessary, will carry 
out a hearing. Included in this are all the steps considered necessary 
to assess whether the adoption is appropriate, taking into account the 
interests of the adoptee and the suitability of the adopter. Finally, if 
the judge considers it appropriate, he or she will issue a constitutive 
resolution. 
II. DECLARATIONS OF WILL 
The fact that the constitutive act is—as indicated—of a judicial 
nature does not imply that the will of the persons involved is irrele-
vant. It is still present, but it has ceased to be constitutive and has 
instead become a necessary precondition to the constitutive act. The 
 
 4. Art. 176.2-176.3 CC. 
 5. See art. 176 CC: the guardianship for adoption (“guarda con fines de 
adopción”) is an institution that allows the minor who needs protection to live 
with their future adopters while the judicial procedure for the constitution of the 
adoption is processed. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Art. 177 CC. 




adoption is constituted by a resolution of the judge that requires, as 
a necessary precondition, the issuance of certain declarations of will. 
If these requirements are not met, the adoption cannot be constituted 
(doing so regardless would affect its validity). However, the opin-
ions contained in these declarations are not binding on the judge, 
who is free to decide on the constitution of the adoption.8  
It seems logical that the will of interested parties should not be 
excluded. The parent-child relationship that constitutes adoption 
cannot be imposed. It is not a relationship originated in nature but 
built by law and based on the will of the persons involved. On the 
other hand, adoption does not only concern the new parents and the 
adoptive child, but there are other subjects involved whose rights 
and legitimate interests must be respected. The fact that their decla-
ration of will is a prerequisite for the constitution of the adoption is 
fundamental to guarantee this respect. Finally, declarations of will 
provide the judge with valuable elements for his or her final deci-
sion.9 
There is not a single category of declarations of will. In fact, the 
law distinguishes three types, even attributing to them different 
names, according to the degree of involvement of the person in the 
adoption and the effectiveness given by law: consent, assent, hear-
ing.  
In light of article 177 CC, if the person who expresses his or her 
will is a party to the adoption, this declaration is qualified as consent. 
Thus, according to the first paragraph of the provision, it is up to the 
 
 8. See JOSÉ LUIS LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., IV EL NUEVO RÉGIMEN DE LA FA-
MILIA: ACOGIMIENTO Y ADOPCIÓN 86 et seq. (Civitas 1989). The authors referred 
to the manifestations of will as necessary, but not binding, procedural presuppo-
sitions. This observation was well received by other authors, such as, for example, 
PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 204. See also JOSÉ JAVIER HUALDE SÁNCHEZ, COMENTA-
RIOS A LAS REFORMAS DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL 185 (Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano ed., 
Tecnos 1993); BARTOLOME VARGAS CABRERA, LA PROTECCIÓN DE MENORES EN 
EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO 220 (Comares 1994).  
 9. See PILAR GUTIÉRREZ SANTIAGO, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA ADOPCIÓN: DE-
CLARACIONES RELEVANTES 96 (Aranzadi 2000). Gutiérrez highlights how the ju-
risprudence of the Audiencias Provinciales refers to the intervention of the vari-
ous persons as evaluative elements. 




adopters and adoptees over the age of twelve to give their consent.10 
Consent must necessarily be given, it can never be waived, and it 
must be in favor of the adoption. 
If the person who expresses his or her will is not a party to the 
adoption, it is considered either assent or a mere hearing, depending 
on the degree to which the adoption is affected. 
Assent must come from the biological parents of the unemanci-
pated adoptee who have not been deprived of their parental author-
ity, are not involved in a legal case regarding deprivation, or who 
have not been suspended in accordance with the terms of article 
177.2 of the Civil Code. The spouse or partner of the adopter must 
also give assent. In certain cases, the law allows for this declaration 
of will to be waived; for example, when those who are to provide it 
are unable to do so. However, when this declaration of will is man-
datory, it must also be in favor of the adoption. 
The judge must simply hear from the following persons: (i) the 
parents who have not been deprived of their parental authority when 
their assent is not required; (ii) when appropriate, the guardian or 
the foster family; and (iii) the adoptee under the age of twelve. It is 
not necessary that the will expressed by these persons is in favor of 
the adoption, although it is necessary that the hearing exists. 
III. RATIONALE FOR THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT 
In this study, we will examine the assent of the biological 
mother, which is necessary—along with that of the father, if pater-
nity is legally determined—to validly constitute the adoption of the 
child. 
The Civil Code requires this assent in article 177.2. This assent 
is based not on the legal relationship of filiation11 but on parental 
 
 10. The exception to the rule is the case of a child under 12 years of age, who, 
because of his or her special conditions, even though he or she is a party, is simply 
heard. 
 11. Authors agree on this, see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 180 et seq.; Ignacio 
Díaz de Lezcano Sevillano, Consentimiento, asentimiento y ausencia en la nueva 
Ley de Adopción, 590 REVISTA CRÍTICA DE DERECHO INMOBILIARIO 28 (1989); 




authority.12 This distinction is revealed by the exemption from the 
requirement when parental authority no longer exists or is affected. 
In particular, the need for the parent’s assent is excluded: (a) when 
the adoptee is emancipated,13 since the adoptee is no longer subject 
to the parental authority of his or her biological parents; (b) or when 
the parents have been deprived of their parental authority,14 are in-
volved in a pending case for deprivation or have been suspended 
from these rights for two years following a declaration of abandon-
ment.15 In this sense, the doctrine justifies the need for assent by 
noting that adoption extinguishes parental authority16 and, therefore, 
cannot take place outside of it.17 
 
Eduardo Hijas Fernández, Las manifestaciones de voluntad en la constitución de 
la adopción, 583 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO 2748 (1993); VARGAS, supra 
note 8, at 232. 
 12. Parental authority (known as “patria potestad”) is regulated by articles 
154 et seq. CC. Art. 154 states the following:  
Non-emancipated children shall be under the parents’ parental authority. 
Parental authority shall be exercised always for the benefit of the chil-
dren, according to their personality, and respecting their rights and phys-
ical and psychological integrity. This authority comprises the following 
duties and powers: 1. To look after them, to have them in their company, 
feed them, educate them and provide them with a comprehensive up-
bringing. 2. To represent them and to manage their property. 
 13. See arts. 314 et seq. CC. Emancipation occurs by attaining the age of ma-
jority (18 years old). But a minor who has reached the age of 16 can be emanci-
pated by his or her parents or a judge. The emancipated minor is no longer under 
parental authority and may govern his or her person and property as if he or she 
were of age, although in order to perform some acts of special importance he or 
she needs the authorization of his or her parents. The juridical relationship be-
tween parent and child does not disappear with emancipation. 
 14. Deprivation of parental authority is regulated in art. 170 CC: “The father 
or the mother may be deprived in whole or in part of their authority pursuant to a 
judgement on grounds of breach of the duties inherent thereto, or rendered in 
criminal or matrimonial proceedings.” 
 15. Art. 172 CC states:  
If the public entity entrusted with the protection of minors in the respec-
tive territory were to become aware that a minor is in a situation of ne-
glect, it shall have ipso iure the guardianship of such minor. . . . A situa-
tion of neglect shall be deemed to exist de facto as a result of the breach 
or the impossible or inadequate exercise of the protection duties set forth 
by the laws for the custody of minors, when they should be deprived of 
the necessary moral or material assistance. 
 16. Art. 169.3 CC. 
 17. See, e.g., José Luis Artero Felipe, El elemento volitivo en la adopción, 12 
ACCIONES E INVESTIGACIONES SOCIALES 65 (2001); BLANCA GESTO ALONSO, EL 
PROCEDIMIENTO DE ADOPCIÓN 67 (Aranzadi 2013).  




I believe, however, that the assent of the parents must transcend 
parental authority and be based on the juridical relationship between 
parent and child. Adoption does indeed put an end to parental au-
thority, but it only does so because the filiation bond is extinguished. 
What is essential is not that parental authority ends, but that filiation 
disappears. Parental authority is merely an institution for the protec-
tion of minors that the law links to parenthood. The parental rela-
tionship has legal content and a significance in the lives of those 
who form a part of it that is much more important in intensity and 
extension than the mere attribution of this temporary function-duty. 
Through the regulation of filiation, the law attributes legal support 
to a relationship that is given by nature itself. The legal bond estab-
lished according to the rules for determining parentage can only be 
destroyed if it is demonstrated in a judicial proceeding that the pa-
ternity or maternity is not authentic. If they are valid, the bond re-
mains. Notwithstanding the above, by regulating adoption, the legal 
system has provided for the creation of a parent-child relationship 
not based on biology. Since the constitution of this new bond neces-
sarily entails the disappearance of the original bond, the biological 
parents, as parties directly involved, must take part: the relationship 
that the law created to recognize their natural bond will cease to ex-
ist. That is the basis of their assent to adoption.  
That said, if the parents do not comply with their parental duties 
and place their child in a situation of need, then the above mentioned 
does not prevent that priority be given to the child’s best interests 
over that of their parents. This makes it easier for the State to rein-
tegrate the child into another family through adoption, without the 
need for the assent of the biological parents, thus depriving them of 
the possibility of deciding on the continuity of the parent-child rela-
tionship.  
What would exclude the juridical relationship between parent 
and child as a basis for parental assent to adoption is the possibility 
that an emancipated child could be adopted without the assent of the 
parents. This adoption would be a unilateral break of the parent-




child bond without the child having a real need to be protected or 
without the parents having failed in their duties; and this fact would 
leave them defenseless. Naturally, precautions should be taken to 
avoid the prevention of a fair adoption due to a malicious refusal of 
the parents. 
It should not be forgotten that the relationship between a parent 
and a child is the strongest to exist. If the law is not indifferent to 
the more—admittedly—banal or collateral interests of other sub-
jects, such as those of the adopter’s spouse or partner, it should not 
disregard the interests that derive from this essential bond. These 
are, in fact, interests that are taken into account by international con-
ventions: the Convention on the Rights of the Child states in article 
9 that “States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated 
from his or her parents against their will” and in article 21, it speci-
fies, concerning adoption, that those persons involved, including the 
parents, must give their “informed consent.” The European Conven-
tion on Adoption18 also requires the assent of the parents and that 
the parents are duly informed: “of the effects of their consent, in 
particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination 
of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of 
origin.” And the European Court of Human Rights has stated that 
adoption without the assent of the mother may be contrary to the 
right to family life proclaimed by article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.19 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT 
The assent of the biological mother, just as—when applicable—
that of the father, is presented as a necessary but non-binding mani-
festation of the will of the person who is not a party to the adoptive 
bond but is affected by it. 
 
 18. European Convention on the Adoption of Children, art. 5(1)(a). 
 19. See Omorefe c. Espagne, No. 69339/16, June 23, 2020. 




Her favorable will is a condition sine qua non for the valid con-
stitution of the adoption. With that manifestation of her will, the 
birth mother, not a party to the bond but affected by it, does not as-
sume the content of the juridical relationship of the adoption, with 
the rights and duties that compose it, but authorizes the production 
of those effects.20 This authorization, is necessary, but—just as with 
consent—not binding for the judge. The judge is not obligated to 
grant the adoption, but once the necessary requirements have been 
met, he or she can decide freely in the best interests of the child. 
The mere existence of the biological mother, and in some cases 
of the legally identified biological father, does not make her assent 
to the adoption mandatory, but the concurrence of certain circum-
stances provided by law is necessary. As already mentioned, the 
adoptee must not be emancipated, and the biological parent must not 
be deprived of his or her parental authority by a final judgement, nor 
have legal grounds for such deprivation, nor have his or her parental 
authority suspended within the period of two years after the notifi-
cation of the declaration of abandonment without opposition or with 
opposition dismissed.21  
However, the Civil Code admits the possibility that, when assent 
is required due to the circumstances indicated, it can be dispensed 
with if the mother who is obliged to provide it is unable to do so. 
Reasons for this may include, for example, that her capacity to act 
has changed, that she has been declared judicially absent, that her 
whereabouts are unknown so that it is impossible to summon her, or 
that if, having been summoned, she does not appear.22  
 
 20. This function of authorization of legal effects has already been referred 
to by VARGAS supra note 8, at 227. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 191, he observes 
that assent is not a diminished or attenuated consent but is a qualified consent-
authorization for the actions of those who are not subject to the relationship that 
is to be constituted by judicial decision. See also Miguel Ángel Pérez Álvarez, 
Comentario al art. 177 del Código civil, in CÓDIGO CIVIL COMENTADO 937 (2d 
ed., Pedro de Pablo Contreras et al. eds., Civitas 2016). 
 21. Art. 177.2.2 CC.  
 22. See art. 177.2 CC; see also art. 38.3, Law 15/2015, of July 2, 2015, Law 
on Voluntary Jurisdiction Law [hereinafter LVJ]. 
 




The basis and importance of the mother’s assent have already 
been pointed out. However, sometimes, situations of impossibility 
or neglect of duties may arise in connection with the manifestation 
of this will, which may even block the adoption. In such cases where 
the judge cannot count on the mother’s assent, if he or she believes 
that adoption is the best option and that it stands a good chance of 
being a successful one, preventing the judge from establishing the 
adoption would cause significant damage to the minor, who would 
be deprived of the protection that this measure of family integration 
offers him. For this reason, the legislator—balancing these circum-
stances and the interests of the child and the mother—is inclined to 
favor the benefit of the child. Thus, the legislator regulates the pos-
sibility that, in these cases, the adoption can be validly constituted 
even without the mandatory assent, sacrificing, if necessary, the pos-
sible interest of the mother, who is still a third party in the adoption. 
In short, it seeks to avoid a situation in which a failure to comply 
with a presupposition—intended to guarantee the interests of a third 
party—caused either by impossibility or by the abandonment of ob-
ligations of the holder of such interests, might prevent an unpro-
tected minor access to a family-integration measure. It should not be 
forgotten that adoption is a measure for the protection of minors. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the law provides for the possi-
bility that a mother who has been unable to give her assent through 
no fault of her own may, if certain circumstances arise, request the 
termination of the adoption under the terms of article 180.2 CC.23  
As to the particular or abstract nature of the mother’s authoriza-
tion of effects, article 177.2 in fine expressly excludes the possibility 
that in adoptions requiring a prior proposal from the public body, 
the assent of the parents may be given to specific adopters. The pro-
vision, which had been contained in the Law on Civil Procedure of 
1881 in art. 1830 (since 1987), has been relocated to the Civil Code 
 
 23. See Antonio Vela Sánchez, Irrevocabilidad, nulidad y extinción de la 
adopción, 70 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 1230 et seq. (2017) for a work on the 
extinction of adoption. 




by Law 26/2015. In order to avoid irregular actions and child traf-
ficking, the law excludes biological parents from decisions related 
to the selection of adopters, which is the responsibility of the admin-
istration. To admit assent with respect to specific adopters would 
imply interference in the selection work of the public entity, which 
would then be seen as subject to the control and approval of the par-
ents. Precisely for this reason, the precept refers to cases in which a 
previous proposal is required: when there is no proposal from the 
public body, which is the exception, the adopters are determined by 
the legally foreseen circumstances and—theoretically—they are not 
chosen.24 On the other hand, in such cases, in reality, either the pro-
hibition is illogical (when the adopter is the spouse or partner of the 
parent25) or it is simply not possible or necessary to obtain their as-
sent (when the parents have died and an uncle is going to adopt the 
orphan,26 when the child is emancipated27 or when a guardian is go-
ing to adopt the child already under their care28). In view of the 
above, it can be said that, in general, the effect authorized by the 
biological mother, and in some cases the father, is the rupture of 
 
 24. Art. 176 CC states that:  
[N]o proposal shall be required if the prospective adoptee meets any of 
the following circumstances:  
1. Being an orphan and a relative of the adopter in the third degree by 
consanguinity or affinity.  
2. Being a child of the spouse or person partnered with the adopter in an 
emotional relationship akin to marriage. 
3. Having been in legal foster care for more than a year under a measure 
of a pre-adoptive foster care, or having been under the adopter’s guardi-
anship for the same time. 
4. Being of legal age or an emancipated minor. 
 25. See art. 176.2.2 CC. 
 26. See art. 176.2.1 CC. 
 27. See art. 176.2.4 CC. 
 28. See art. 176.2.3 CC: The prohibition would make sense only in the case 
of adoption—without proposal—by the pre-adoptive guardian for more than one 
year, as there would have been a prior selection by the public entity and there 
could be interference. 




their legal parental bonds and the constitution of new ones,29 with 
indifference as to who these bonds are formed with.30 
Finally, the declaration of the mother’s will is of a strictly per-
sonal nature, as it will be shown below. This excludes the possibility 
of representation. Proof of this is that, as has been mentioned, article 
177.2 CC establishes that assent can be dispensed with when the 
person who must give it is unable to do so.31  
V. FORM OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT 
Law 26/2015 has introduced a new paragraph in article 177 CC, 
which refers jointly to the form of issuance of consents and assents: 
“they shall be freely granted, with the required legal form and in 
writing, after information about the consequences thereof has been 
provided.” Since it refers to the “required legal form,” it is necessary 
to refer to the specific provisions of the law in this regard: in partic-
ular to article 177.2 of the Civil Code and, especially, articles 35.2 
and 37.1 of Law 15/2015, of July 2, 2015, on Voluntary Jurisdiction 
(LVJ)—which replaces the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law 
(LCP).32  
 
 29. It should be noted that except in the case of an open adoption, the possi-
bility of the birth parents having knowledge of the specific adopters proposed is, 
or should be, limited. Art. 39.2 LVJ establishes that the proceedings will be car-
ried out with appropriate reservation, avoiding in particular that the family of 
origin has knowledge of the adoptive one. So it would not be easy for birth parents 
to give their assent to the adopters. This possibility was expressly excluded by 
lawmakers in order to reinforce their policy of combating these irregular practices. 
 30. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 184: Pérez Álvarez has observed that what 
the law prohibits is that the assent of the parents refer to “specific adopters,” that 
is to say, the personalized determination of the adopter, but not the circumstances 
that must be present in it. He therefore considers that “nothing precludes the pos-
sibility for parents to condition their assent to the fact that the adoptive parents 
meet certain circumstances (morality, livelihood, or concurrence of certain family 
budgets. . . .).” He adds that “if this is admitted, it would appear that what is ex-
cluded is subjectively-conditioned assent, but not assent that would have been 
objectively conditioned.” In the same sense, María Angeles Parra Lucán, Autono-
mía de la voluntad y derecho de familia, in 1 AUTONOMÍA DE LA VOLUNTAD EN 
EL DERECHO PRIVADO: ESTUDIOS EN CONMEMORACIÓN DEL 150 ANIVERSARIO DE 
LA LEY DEL NOTARIADO 421-422 (Wolters Kluwer 2012).  
 31. See section VI. 
 32. Before the LVJ, the matter had been regulated, since 1987, by the Civil 
Procedure Act of 1881 under arts. 1829.1(c), 1830. The new law has retained the 




In view of these precepts, the issuance of the biological mother’s 
assent is not obligatory before the judge, unlike the consent of those 
who are part of the adoption. The law establishes two different mo-
ments for the provision of assent—before or after the opening of a 
file for a specific adoption and three ways of issuing it: in a public 
document, before the public entity, or before the judge, which links 
the different phases or moments: 
(i) Issuance of assent before the file is opened: the law allows 
assent to be given before the adoption file is opened, either before 
the public body or in a public document, at the choice of the issuer. 
This prior assent must be stated in the proposal of the public entity, 
so that the court clerk does not summon the mother and that the 
judge is aware of the fulfilment of the requirement.33  
The assent thus given has an expiry period of six months from 
its issuance.34 Although the Voluntary Jurisdiction Law does not ex-
pressly say so, it seems that the time at which it must be checked 
whether the assent has expired is when the adoption proposal is sub-
mitted. This was stated in the previous article 1830.2 LCP. This pre-
cept also indicated that, once this period had passed, it was neces-
sary for the assent to be renewed before the judge. The new article 
37.1 LVJ does not expressly mention the necessary renewal before 
the judge either, but it can be deduced, without a doubt, from the 
provision for summoning the subjects in question before the judge. 
On the other hand, inasmuch as the law does not establish the 
irrevocability of the assent thus given, there does not seem to be any 
inconvenience in the possibility that, so long as a file is not initiated, 
a retraction of assent may be issued in the same form in which it was 
given. In such a case, the mother obligated to give her assent must 
be summoned under the terms of article 37.1 LVJ in order to issue 
it before the judge, if necessary.  
 
essence of the previous regulation, although with some variation in the wording 
of the rules entailing certain substantive changes. 
 33. See arts. 35.2-35.4 LVJ; see also art. 37.2 LVJ. 
 34. Art. 37.1.2 LVJ. 




(ii) Issuance of the assent once the file has been opened: once 
the file has been opened, the mother who, according to article 
177.2 CC, must assent and has not yet done so—either in a public 
document or before the public entity—or who, having given her as-
sent more than six months ago such that it has expired, will be sum-
moned to do so before the judge.35  
In regard to the possibility that, having given assent before the 
judge, it could be revoked before a decision is made, it is not easily 
defensible, just as it happens in the case of consent. Just as con-
sent—of adopters and, if applicable, the adopted—is configured by 
the law as an essential element in the constitution of the adoption, 
so that it is not possible to imagine an adoption without the favorable 
will of those who are a party to it, the same is not true of assent, 
since—as has already been explained—the law has no problem in 
declaring an adoption without it. It must be also added that a great 
deal of damage could be caused to the child by desisting at the last 
minute—after the time and energy invested in the procedure—by a 
person whose will is not considered essential by the law.36 For all 
these reasons, revocation is not easily justifiable. Notwithstanding 
the above, the fact that it does not seem defensible that the mother’s 
repentance automatically prevents the constitution of the adoption 
does not mean that the judge should disregard it: if he or she is aware 
of this circumstance, it should be considered in making the final de-
cision.37 It should not be forgotten that the judge in the adoption 
resolution must decide in accordance with the best interests of the 
child.38 
 
 35. Art. 37.1 LVJ. 
 36. In this sense, you have to count on it. According to Organic Law 8/2015, 
of July 22, 2015, art. 2.3(c), the irreversible effect of the passage of time on the 
development of the child is an element to be taken into account in determining the 
interest of the child. 
 37. See art. 176.1 CC. 
 38. See art. 176.1 CC and art. 39.1 LVJ. 




VI. BIRTH MOTHER’S CAPACITY TO ASSENT 
The Civil Code does not contain any special provisions regard-
ing the capacity to give assent to adoption. This may pose problems 
in cases where the biological mother lacks the general capacity to 
act because she has not reached the age of majority39 or because an 
order depriving her of capacity to act has been issued.40  
In such cases, someone could argue that that the assent to the 
adoption of the child should be given by the mother’s representa-
tives. However, assent is a strictly personal act, which excludes rep-
resentation. Proof of this is that the law admits that assent is dis-
pensed with when the one who must give it is unable to do so.41 It 
should be remembered that strictly personal acts are those that, due 
to their importance or centrality, can only be performed by the per-
son herself. For these acts, the natural capacity to give valid consent 
is sufficient, and representation is excluded. Insofar as the mother’s 
assent implies the elimination of the legal mother-child relationship 
and the consequent modification of her “civil status,”42 it falls within 
the category of a personal act. Because of this, no one can supplant 
her in this decision. Therefore, her natural capacity should be suffi-
cient to issue her assent. 
 
 39. See art. 322 CC. 
 40. See art. 199 CC. See also art. 322 CC. In Spanish law “A person who is 
of legal age (18 years old) has capacity for all acts of civil life. . . .” But when the 
person of legal age does not have the natural capacity to govern himself, he or she 
may be deprived of the capacity to act in law by means of a judicial decision. Art. 
199 CC. states: “No one may be declared incapable save pursuant to a court judge-
ment due to the causes set forth in the law.” And art. 200 CC states: “Persistent 
physical or mental illnesses or deficiencies which prevent a person from govern-
ing himself shall be causes for incapacitation.” A legally incapacitated person has 
a guardian who takes care of his or her person and property and who can represent 
him or her. 
 41. See art. 177.2 CC. 
 42. In Spanish law, “civil status” includes personal situations, endowed with 
a certain stability and permanence, which influence the person’s capacity to act 
or determine the attribution of specific rights or duties, and which the legal system 
considers fundamental for the organization of society, thereby granting them the 
same formal regime which basically affects the allocation of certain shares and 
the peculiarities of their evidence. 




Concerning the natural capacity to perform strictly personal acts, 
the law sometimes establishes a general presumption of aptitude for 
specific acts when the person reaches a certain age, thus avoiding 
the need to examine capacity in each specific case. For example, in 
the case of a will—with the exception of a holographic will—there 
is a general presumption of natural capacity to create a valid will 
after the age of fourteen.43 In the case of a marriage, the law indi-
rectly presumes that from the age of sixteen onwards the person has 
the capacity to consent to the marriage.44 When recognizing chil-
dren, it is also indirectly presumed that the person has the full natural 
capacity to do so from the age of sixteen onwards, excluding the 
need for judicial approval.45  
This does not hold in the specific case of assent to adoption, 
where the law does not establish a presumption of natural capacity 
from a specific age. This provision does not seem to impede having 
the assent of a minor biological mother as a necessary requirement 
for the valid constitution of the adoption.46 This presumption is all 
the more true if one takes into account the legislator’s choice to 
make mandatory the will of the minor regarding the adoption: it re-
quires the consent of the adoptee older than twelve and allows dual 
adoption by a minor spouse (when the other spouse has reached the 
age of twenty-five).47 On this matter, the Tribunal Supremo (Su-
preme Court) considered an adoption void on the grounds that the 
assent given by the minor biological mother corresponded to a ficti-
tious adoption.48 
 
 43. See arts. 663.1, 688 CC. 
 44. Compare art. 46 CC with arts. 317, 320 CC. 
 45. Compare art. 121 CC with arts. 46, 317, 320 CC. 
 46. Pérez is inclined to consider the mother’ assent to be mandatory in cases 
of minority status: see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 188 n.229; And, in the same vein, 
see VARGAS, supra note 8, at 233: in relation to parents, Vargas Cabrera observes 
that “the condition of father or mother and sufficient discernment will suffice to 
give the corresponding declaration of will.”  
 47. PÉREZ, supra note 3. 
 48. See Judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Jan. 18, 2012. 




Since there is no legal presumption of natural capacity to assent 
to an adoption based on age, it is necessary to evaluate on a case-by-
case basis whether the biological mother has such natural capacity. 
Given that the degree of physical maturity necessary for a woman to 
be able to procreate requires her to have reached an age at which she 
will normally have acquired some capacity for discernment, she will 
usually be in a position to assent, except in situations of too-early 
motherhood.  
If the biological mother is mentally disabled and a declaration of 
incapacity exists, the declaration will usually delimit her legal ca-
pacity to assent. If nothing is specified in the declaration or there is 
no declaration, she will only lack the capacity to validly assent if 
that particular circumstance entails a lack of natural capacity to un-
derstand the adoption.49 
In the exceptional case that the mother lacks natural capacity, 
she will not be able to give valid assent and, given the strictly per-
sonal nature of the act, it will also not be possible—as was previ-
ously mentioned—for it to be given by proxy. However, this will 
not paralyze the adoption, since the situation fits the de facto case of 
“impossibility” mentioned in article 177.2 CC, which allows the 
judge to waive the assent and continue with the adoption regardless. 
In such cases, however, the mother will simply be heard by the 
judge.50  
It should be noted that the strictly personal nature of the mother’s 
assent to the adoption excludes not only representation but also as-
sistance: she must give it herself and on her own, without the need, 
if she is a minor or is legally incapacitated, for her decision to be 
 
 49. These sources also allude to the lack of discernment when there is no 
judgement: see MANUEL FELIÚ REY, COMENTARIOS DE LA LEY DE ADOPCIÓN 151 
(Tecnos 1989); see also VARGAS, supra note 8, at 240; Roncesvalles Barber Cár-
camo, La filiación adoptiva, in 5 TRATADO DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA 701 (2d ed., 
Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada & Matilde Cuena Casa eds., Aranzadi 2017); Carmen 
Callejo Rodríguez, El asentimiento a la adopción de los padres del adoptando no 
emancipado, 9 LA LEY DERECHO DE FAMILIA: REVISTA JURÍDICA SOBRE FAMILIA 
Y MENORES 13 (2016). 
 50. See art. 177.3.1 CC. 




accompanied by the consent of her representatives, as is the case 
with any act of this nature (will, marriage, recognition of children, 
etc.).51 The parents of the minor or incapacitated mother do not even 
have to be heard by the judge. Although traditionally the Civil Code 
has relied on expressions of will from other relatives or persons re-
lated to the parties to the adoption, Law 21/1987 simplified the 
lineup in order to speed up and favor the adoption. However, the fact 
that the hearing is not mandatory does not mean that the judge can-
not carry it out, if he or she deems it appropriate: article 39.1 LVJ 
empowers him or her to “order as many procedural acts as he or she 
considers appropriate.” 
Finally, it should be noted that, in any case (and as a last resort), 
the decision as to whether the adoption is appropriate is in the hands 
of the judge,52 which means that assent is not exempt from judicial 
control. In this way, the situation of the minor or the incapacitated 
mother is not different from that provided for by the law in other 
strictly personal acts in which, given their transcendence, judicial 
approval is required. This is what happens, for example, in the case 
 
 51. It is surprising that, in the judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Jan. 18, 
2012, the Court unexplainably expressed the idea that the assent of the minor 
mother would have required the concurrence of her parents. This can only be jus-
tified by the fact that the assent of the biological mother is based on her exercise 
of parental authority over her child insofar as art. 157 CC provides that the une-
mancipated minor shall exercise parental authority with the assistance of his or 
her parents. In this regard, it should be noted that some authors have understood, 
along these lines, that assent is contained in the functions of parental authority: 
see Barber, supra note 49, at 706. Without denying that, in most cases, the parents 
agree to the adoption for the sake of the child and are therefore carrying out an act 
of protection proper to the exercise of this power, it should not be overlooked that 
this is not always the case (at least directly): a parent may assent to the adoption 
simply because, thinking of himself or herself, he or she does not want a parental 
relationship; and, on the other hand, the relationship with the child is more than 
parental authority, therefore—as already stated—the basis of assent goes beyond 
this power and lies in the parental relationship. This precludes the application of 
art. 157 CC to the assent of the biological mother and excludes the need for pa-
rental assistance. On the other hand, this entails—as has been developed in the 
text—its consideration as a strictly personal act, which can only be carried out by 
the person himself, personally and solely, eliminating the intervention of the par-
ents or representatives. 
 52. See art. 176 CC. 




of recognition of children by those judged mentally incapable or mi-
nors.53 
In view of the above, it is desirable to introduce into article 
177 CC a specific regulation of the biological mother’s capacity to 
assent to the adoption in order to avoid the court having to infer it 
by resorting to a systematic interpretation. This is particularly criti-
cal because it is not uncommon for the biological mother to be a 
minor, especially when the adoption takes place immediately after 
birth. Adding this regulation would prevent doubt and provide legal 
certainty. 
VII. THE SIX-WEEK PERIOD: A LIMITATION ON THE AUTONOMY OF 
WOMEN’S WILL 
Since the 1987 reform, the Civil Code has contained a limitation 
on the biological mother’s ability to give assent, which has recently 
been intensified. The European Convention on the Adoption of Chil-
dren, executed in Strasbourg on April 24, 1967, established in article 
5.4 a minimum period of six weeks after birth for the mother to give 
her assent to adoption. Some countries have included this period—
or an even longer one—as part of their legislation.54 Others dis-
pensed with a minimum period.55 Spain did not ratify the Conven-
tion and opted—as Pérez Álvarez notes56—for an intermediate posi-
tion between the six-week period set by the Convention and the ab-
sence of a time limit, setting instead a minimum period of 30 days 
from birth. Initially, the period envisaged in the 1987 Law Draft was 
fifteen days, but an amendment passed, extending it to thirty days.57 
 
 53. See art. 121 CC. 
 54. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 187, n.226; England and Germany are cited 
as examples. 
 55. Id. at 187. Pérez Álvarez noted that the idea of the time limit was not 
without controversy: the limit was criticized because the mother’s relationship 
with her child could make adoption difficult. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos 
de Ley, Mar. 13, 1987 No. 22-4, 25. See also the report of the conference favora-
ble to its acceptance: BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A: 
Proyectos de Ley, June 2, 1987, No. 22-5, 67; and the approval by the 




The 2008 European Convention on the Adoption of Children, 
which replaced the 1967 Convention, establishes in article 5.5 that 
“[a] mother’s consent to the adoption of her child shall be valid 
when it is given at such time after the birth of the child, not being 
less than six weeks, as may be prescribed by law. . . .” It also gives 
countries the option of not specifying a particular period, instead al-
lowing the mother to give her assent when the competent authority 
determines that she has recovered from the consequences of child-
birth. Since Spain has ratified the European Convention on Adop-
tion, the 2015 reform has been used to adapt the Civil Code to the 
new international standard, opting, along the lines maintained since 
1987, to establish a specific period of time, surely because it is con-
sidered to provide more certainty. Thus, Law 26/2015 has modified 
article 177.2.2 CC and has extended the period during which the 
mother can assent to the adoption, from thirty days to six weeks from 
the birth: “The assent of the mother cannot be given until six weeks 
have elapsed since the birth.”58  
This means that a woman’s assent is not valid during pregnancy 
or even after delivery, so long as six weeks have not passed. This 
was made clear by the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) in its 
well-known September 21, 1999 decision, which was handed down 
 
Commission with full legislative competence: BOCG, Congreso de los Dipu-
tados, III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos de Ley, June 20, 1987, No. 22-6, 90. 
 58. The number of countries that have ratified the Convention is low. Such 
countries usually provide for a longer minimum period, but not only for the 
mother but for the two parents: eight weeks in Germany (§ 1747 BGB: “Die Ein-
willigung kann erst erteilt werden, wenn das Kind acht Wochen alt ist.”) and Fin-
land (Section 15, Act No. 22/2012, adopted on Jan. 20, 2012: “A parent’s consent 
to an adoption may not be received until the parent has had the opportunity to 
consider the matter thoroughly and eight weeks have elapsed from the birth of the 
child.”); two months in Belgium (art. 348.4 Code civil: “La mère et le père ne 
peuvent consentir à l’adoption que deux mois après la naissance de l’enfant.”) and 
Norway (Section 10, Act of June 16, 2017, No. 48 relating to adoption: “the par-
ents’ consent may not be given until two months after the birth of the child.”); 
sixty days in Romania (art. 466 C.Civ.: “Consimţământul la adopţie al părinţilor 
fireşti sau, după caz, al tutorelui poate fi dat numai după trecerea unui termen de 
60 de zile de la data naşterii copilului.”); three months in Denmark (The Danish 
Adoption Act, No. 8: “Consent cannot be accepted before three (3) months after 
the birth of the child, unless special circumstances prevail.”). 




under the previous version of the provision. The court considered 
null and void, in violation of a mandatory rule, the assent to adoption 
given by a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy in a document 
explaining that she could not take care of her child because of fam-
ily, social, emotional and economic circumstances and stating that 
she had been informed of her rights and the consequences of her 
assent.59 
Given the importance of assent to adoption, the reason for the 
rule contained in article 177 CC is to allow the woman to achieve 
the emotional stability necessary to evaluate the different options 
with perspective and calm and to decide with full freedom and con-
science.60 Similarly, the Council of Europe has explained that the 
objective of article 5.5 of the European Convention on Adoption is 
“to avoid premature adoptions to which mothers give their consent 
as a result of pressure exerted before the birth of the child or before 
their physical health and psychological balance have been restored 
after the child’s birth.”61 On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that 
the prohibition to give consent during pregnancy also has the 
 
 59. On this judgement, see, e.g., among others: María Ballesteros de los Ríos, 
Reclamación de filiación materna frustrada por la no práctica de una prueba 
biológica esencial y adopción declarada nula por asentimiento prestado con an-
terioridad al parto, 13 DERECHO PRIVADO Y CONSTITUCIÓN 37 et seq. (1999); 
GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 9, at 132 et seq. 
 60. The amendment of the 1987 draft law, which led to the extension of the 
period from 15 to 30 days, was justified on the grounds that the period was too 
short and that it was appropriate to extend it so that the mother, who had already 
recovered, was “in full freedom and conscience to gauge the seriousness of the 
act of assent to the adoption of her child.” See BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, 
III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos de Ley, Mar. 13, 1987, No. 22-4, 25. The afore-
mentioned Judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Sept. 21, 1999 explains that 
“the reasons for this legal caution are explained by the need to ensure that the 
essential faculties of freedom and conscience are fully present in the biological 
mother, so that she can carefully and serenely measure the renunciation of the 
exercise of her motherhood with the child’s release for adoption.” And, more re-
cently, in the Report on the Preliminary Draft of 2015, the General Council of the 
Judiciary expressed its support for the extension of the deadline to six weeks as it 
ensures “the greatest possible peace of mind and the freedom of the mother to 
grant her assent,” see Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Informe del Consejo 
General del Poder Judicial al Anteproyecto de Ley de Protección a la Infancia 
84 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
 61. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the European Convention on 
the Adoption of Children (Revised) 6, #202 (Strasbourg, Nov. 27, 2008). 




objective of fighting against child trafficking and even against prac-
tices that may favor surrogacy, which is prohibited by Spanish law. 
Given the good intentions of the legislator that can be seen in the 
inclusion of this caution, this waiting period has been accepted nat-
urally and without further discussion.62 However, perhaps it is time 
for further reflection on this issue, not only at the national level but 
also at the European level, in light of the new social and legal reali-
ties and trends. 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the autonomy of 
the will in all areas, especially in the areas of persons and family.63 
This autonomy extends to all persons, including those who have tra-
ditionally been protected by depriving them of their capacity to de-
cide because of their special characteristics.64 A reform of the Span-
ish Civil Code is planned to remove the judicial incapacity of per-
sons with disabilities65 in order to adapt the internal order to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties (2006). This Convention changes the paradigm and establishes 
that the autonomy of the will of these persons must be promoted and 
 
 62. See, e.g., FELIÚ, supra note 49, at 151; VARGAS, supra note 8, at 237; 
GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 9, at 131; Artero, supra note 17, at 67; GESTO, supra note 
17, at 70 et seq.; Sonia Calaza López, El nuevo proceso de filiación por adopción, 
36 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL 240 (2015); Cárcamo, supra note 
49, at 715-716; Callejo, supra note 49, at 6-7; Carlos Martínez de Aguirre Aldaz, 
La historia interminable: una nueva reforma de la adopción, in EL NUEVO RÉGI-
MEN JURÍDICO DEL MENOR: LA REFORMA LEGISLATIVA DE 2015 342 (Maria Victo-
ria Mayor del Hoyo ed., Aranzadi 2017). 
 63. On the subject, see Parra, supra note 30, at 97 et seq.  
 64. On the new trend in favor of the autonomy of persons with disabilities 
generated since the 2006 U.N. Convention on the Rights of Personas and Disabi-
lities, see, e.g., MONTSERRAT PEREÑA VICENTE ET AL., LA VOLUNTAD DE LA PER-
SONA PROTEGIDA: OPORTUNIDADES RIESGOS Y SALVAGUARDAS (Dykinson 2018); 
SOFIA DE SALAS MURILLO & MARIA VICTORIA MAYOR DEL HOYO, CLAVES PARA 
LA ADAPTACIÓN DEL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO PRIVADO A LA CONVENCIÓN DE 
NACIONES UNIDAS EN MATERIA DE DISCAPACIDAD (Tirant lo Blanch 2019). 
 65. See Anteproyecto de Ley por la que se reforma la legislación civil y pro-
cesal para el apoyo a las personas con discapacidad en el ejercicio de su capa-
cidad jurídica (Jan. 2019). 




protected: they must be able to decide for themselves, and they have 
the right to make mistakes.66 
This trend that empowers the autonomy of the will clashes with 
the paternalism that the law still maintains, in matters of adoption, 
with respect to pregnant women or women who have just become 
mothers. The Code, finding its justification in the importance of the 
decision, deprives women in these circumstances of any possibility 
to decide on the matter, on the assumption that they lack the capacity 
to do so. This is an irrebuttable presumption, i.e., one which does 
not admit evidence to the contrary. This presumption, in addition to 
affecting the free development of the woman’s personality, may 
place her in a complicated situation, extending the suffering and 
psychological burden that may be involved in having a pending de-
cision regarding her child and going through the issuance of assent. 
However, this lack of confidence in the decision-making capacity of 
the pregnant woman has been abandoned by the legislator in other 
areas: the law itself, in Organic Law 2/2010, of March 3, 2010, on 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and the Voluntary Interruption of 
Pregnancy (in which no limitations of this type are introduced), de-
fends the importance of the autonomy of the woman’s will in mat-
ters of filiation. It maintains that the decision about children “con-
stitutes one of the most intimate and personal matters that people 
face throughout their lives, which integrates an essential area of in-
dividual self-determination” and that “the protection of this area of 
personal autonomy has a singular significance for women.”67  
It cannot be ignored that, at times, the emotional tension—char-
acteristic of human beings—that surrounds the birth of a child, as 
well as the pressure of certain personal, economic, and social cir-
cumstances, can constitute a handicap in decision-making regarding 
the relationship of filiation. It is, therefore, understandable that the 
 
 66. See U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General 
Comment No. 1, Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law (2014), 
https://perma.cc/U7TF-QMQ6. 
 67. See Organic Law 2/2010, of March 3, 2010, on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy, Section I of the Preamble. 




legal system should adopt some caution that takes this reality into 
account for the benefit of all parties. 
However, the legislator must find a balance between this caution 
and the exercise of the decision-making power. It must also take into 
account all those involved. It is true that in the tension that surrounds 
birth there is an important physical component that (obviously) only 
affects women and that can even be complicated by conditions such 
as postpartum depression.68 However, this tension does not have an 
exclusively physical origin, but rather has another psychological 
component that derives naturally from the arrival of a child into the 
world and is present in both parents. Therefore, even if it is not what 
is usually done, when filiation is determined with regard to the fa-
ther, (for example, because of the existence of marriage69) these 
considerations should also be taken into account with regard to him. 
In order to ensure this integrative balance, the law could allow 
parents to give their assent to adoption at any time during pregnancy 
and at any time after birth, but with the possibility of freely revoking 
it within a period of time, which could be, for example, during the 
two or three months immediately following birth.70 The determina-
tion of the period of revocability should take into account the child’s 
 
 68. On the subject, see DANIELA WADIA JARUFE CONTRERAS, TRATAMIENTO 
LEGAL DE LAS FILIACIONES NO BIOLÓGICAS EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO ESPA-
ÑOL: ADOPCIÓN VERSUS TÉCNICAS DE REPRODUCCIÓN HUMANA ASISTIDA 241-242 
(Dykinson 2013). 
 69. See art. 116 CC. 
 70. This possibility is not alien to the legislator, who already raised it in the 
drafting of the 1987 Act. Thus, the first Draft Law, of Mar. 10, 1986, proposed 
the following wording of art. 176.3 CC: “The irrevocable assent of the mother of 
the adoptee shall not be accepted until fifteen days have elapsed since the birth” 
(emphasis added). In favor of it, see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 187, n.228. In some 
previous work I already defended the prior provision of a revocable assent: see 
Maria Victoria Mayor del Hoyo, Más allá del acogimiento de menores: incapa-
citados, tercera edad y nasciturus, 734 REVISTA CRÍTICA DE DERECHO INMOBI-
LIARIO 3235-3236 (2012); MARIA VICTORIA MAYOR DEL HOYO, LA ADOPCIÓN EN 
EL DERECHO COMÚN ESPAÑOL 243 et seq. (Tirant lo Blanch 2019). In the same 
vein, see Parra, supra note 30, at 422. also spoke in favor of a system similar to 
this one, setting the deadline for revocation within two months after childbirth: 
see JARUFE, supra note 68, at 241 (previously, in the defense of his doctoral dis-
sertation, he already advocated this possibility). 




interest in not prolonging uncertainty in order to avoid the irreversi-
ble effect of the passage of time on his or her development.71  
In particular, a system could be set up to provide assent in the 
form of a public document that can be registered ex officio by the 
notary in a registry created ad hoc. Once the assent has been issued 
in these terms, the parents could, at any moment before the deadline 
set by law, change their mind in a new notarized document. Once 
this period of time has elapsed without exercise of the power of rev-
ocation, the assent given would automatically become firm and no 
new manifestation of will—not even a confirmation of the previous 
one—would be necessary. With that firmness, the manifestation of 
will would acquire—by virtue of the law—the juridical condition of 
valid assent to adopt, that is assent ad adoptionem, and would open 
the door to the possible constitution of the adoption. Moreover, this 
assent would not expire. The public body and the judge would only 
need to consult the assent kept in the registry. 
This is my proposal de lege ferenda: this proposal would allow 
respect for the autonomy of the will of women who would not be 
deprived of their capacity to decide because they are in a state of 
gestation or have recently given birth, favoring the free development 
of their personality and facilitating things at a difficult time for them, 
in a manner that is coherent with the rest of the order and the new 
social reality.  
At the same time, it would allow the introduction of a prudent 
caution that, given the complexity of the situation, could be of help, 
both by offering calm to those making the decision and by facilitat-
ing, if necessary, conformation with the perspective of the will. It 
could even be said that this option allows for greater perspective, 
given that the proposed system would allow the extension of the 
term given to consider the decision.  
 
 71. See Organic Law 8/2015, of July 22, 2015, art. 2.3 c).  




The proposal would not be detrimental to the child since the 
limit to the power of revocation would be determined by the child’s 
interest.  
The proposal would also enable birth parents to be placed on an 
equal footing with respect to each other, by adapting the system once 
again to the new social sensibilities. 
The proposal would solve the problem, already denounced by 
the Special Committee of the Senate that studied the adoption,72 that 
sometimes causes the disappearance of the mother when she leaves 
the hospital, before the deadline for her to give her assent to the 
adoption has passed. 
The system would in no way constitute an adoption of the nas-
citurus, insofar as the adoption could only be constituted from the 
moment the assent became final. And, moreover, the current adop-
tion procedure is designed, as already stated, to firmly prevent any 
irregular practice related to child trafficking or other actions prohib-
ited by law. It should be remembered, on the one hand, that it is the 
responsibility of the public entity to declare the suitability and se-
lection of the adopters and that, except in the case of assessed cases, 
for an adoption file to be opened it must be proposed by the public 
entity. And, on the other hand, the adoption is constituted by judicial 
resolution with the guarantees that this implies. 
Finally, from a teleological point of view, the system would not 
conflict with the European Convention on Adoption, given that the 
mother’s assent would only be understood to have been given, in the 
strict or technical sense, once the previously expressed wish had be-
come firm because the two or three months following the birth, fixed 
by law, had elapsed without revocation. Only at that time, and not 
before (as it is subject to revocation), would the will be said to ac-
quire the legal status of assent and be valid. In any case, it would be 
desirable that in future revisions of the European Convention on 
 
 72. See Informe de la Comisión Especial de Estudio de la problemática de la 
adopción nacional y otros temas afines, BOCG, Senado, IX legislatura, Series I, 
Nov. 17, 2010, No. 545, at 9, 17, 20, 49, 53. 




Adoption, the content of article 5.5 be reconsidered, in order to adapt 
it to the new realities and to avoid inappropriate limitations on the 
woman’s capacity to decide. 
Until this revision of the European Convention on Adoption is 
done, the proposal may be extrapolated, with the appropriate adap-
tations, to the other European legal systems mentioned above that 
have ratified the Convention and that, following the provisions of 
the Convention, limit the autonomy of the will of women by setting 
a minimum time limit for giving assent to adoption. 
 
 
 
